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FRANCIS LIEBER:  ANGLICAN AND GALLICAN LIBERTY 
READING AND STUDY GUIDE, 1999-2000 
Steven Alan Samson 
 
NOTE:  The following essay appeared originally in a newspaper published at Columbia, South Carolina, 
June 7, 1849, and is obviously suggested by recent events in France.  Professor Mittermaier, of 
Heidelberg, caused the article to be translated and printed in the Zeitschrift für ausländische 
Gesetzgebung, xxi. Bd., 2 Hft. (1849).  A few notes subsequently made by Dr. Lieber upon a copy 
partially prepared for republication are here subjoined to the essay as originally published.  Reference 
should be made, in connection with this paper, to the author’s remarks on the same subjects in his Civil 
Liberty.—G. 
 
 
If the term Liberty, which always means unrestrainedness of action,1
 
 is applied to 
matters of civil society, it necessarily chiefly signifies protection of the free action of 
each member against the individual interference of any other member, and against 
society collectively, or public power. 
Since, however, perfect freedom of action is impossible in any society, because every 
member claims the same freedom of action, and the society itself has its own important 
ends, as society collectively taken, it is obvious that civil liberty must always mean 
something relative.  We designate, therefore, by civil liberty, the highest amount of that 
untrammeled and well-guaranteed action or absence of interference which is compatible 
with a social state and with the objects of a government established to obtain, by united 
energy, that which is considered essential to each member, but cannot, or ought not, to 
be obtained by individual exertion.  If, then, on the one hand, we never speak of liberty 
where we do not find a very high degree of well-secured independent action, it is natural 
on the other hand, that the idea of civil liberty varies with the different views which men 
may take, at the various stages of civilization, of that which is essential to man—in other 
words, of the essentials of humanity and the object and purpose of his terrestrial life.  It 
follows that it is not inconsistent to speak of ancient liberty as contradistinguished to 
modern; for the ancients viewed man in his highest phase as citizen.  The human being 
was, according to them, man, in the truest and noblest sense of the word, only as 
member of the state; but Christianity and modern civilization place the individual, with 
his individual responsibility, his personal claims, and his individual immortal soul as the 
highest object, and the state, law, and government, however vitally important to each 
person and to civilization, are for the moderns still but a means to obtain the yet higher 
                                                     
1 Freedom, in its highest acceptation, means the faculty of willing, and the power of doing what has been 
willed, unrestrained by any extraneous influence—it means perfect self-determination.  Absolute freedom, 
therefore, can be imagined only in conjunction with perfect power.  The Almighty alone is perfectly free.  
To all other beings we can attribute freedom, but only in an approximate or relative sense.  As to the 
synonyms freedom and liberty, the former is personal, individual, and relates to the whole being; the latter 
is granted, guaranteed, and, therefore, generally of a public character.  The slave receives freedom, the 
captive liberty.  We speak of the freedom of will, and of civil liberty.  The same distinction is, I think, even 
traceable in the two expressions, freedom of speech and liberty of conscience; for freedom of conscience 
always exists, but when this freedom comes to be guaranteed by the laws of a country as a right to 
worship as the citizen chooses, we call it liberty of conscience, because it is an external guarantee of the 
internal freedom. 
objects of humanity. 
 
It is equally clear, that for all practical purposes, we mean, by the word liberty, certain 
measures and institutions which secure the enjoyment of that which constitutes liberty in 
the opinion of men at any given period.  Thus we find that Aristotle, when he speaks of 
liberty in his Politics (and not in his metaphysical works), means peculiar institutions.  
He goes farther:  certain institutions serve him as tests whether liberty did or did not 
exist in the state which he had under contemplation; and in modern times we find that, 
while individuals might not easily agree upon the true import of the word liberty, if 
considered in a general sense, entire nations are agreed among themselves, with a 
remarkable degree of unanimity, upon the political principles and measures necessary 
for the establishment or perpetuation of liberty.  There exist, of course, some 
differences.  One civi8l society will consider a certain institution as a necessary element 
of substantial civil liberty, which may not appear in the same light to others; perhaps 
because they have not yet arrived at the same degree of civil development; but, as it 
has been stated already, the unanimity of the Europeans and their descendants in 
America, upon this subject, is remarkable, and furnishes a very high degree of 
presumption that those institutions, established or struggled for, are in reality necessary 
for freemen. 
 
These guarantees, the bulk of which, in modern times, is termed liberty, will be found to 
consist in the highest protection of the individual and of society, chiefly against public 
power, because it is necessarily from this power that the greatest danger threatens the 
citizen, or that the most serious infringement of untrammeled action is to be feared. 
 
Civil liberty, then, consists, as the free modern nations understand it, according to the 
present standard of political civilization, in: 
 
  Protection of communion; liberty of the press; and what is called protection 
 of the epistolary secret. 
  The right of the people, in the highest acceptation of the word, to adopt 
that government they think best; no extra governmental power, which yet deeply 
affects the government, except the sovereignty of the people; no divine right. 
  Full protection of person; no arrest except by law, and speedy trial after 
arrest; the habeas corpus principle, with a system of fair bailment. 
  Free choice of residence, and free locomotion; the right of emigration; free 
egress and ingress. 
  Full protection of every man’s religion or worship; liberty of conscience. 
  Protection of free production and exchange, as the individual thinks best, 
and a high protection of property, acquired or acquiring; no taxation (which is a 
demand of part of property) without consent of the tax-payer (the owner of the 
property). 
  Submission to laws and lawful authority alone; the perfect right of resisting 
unlawful authority, or unlawful demands, though made by lawfully installed 
authority. 
  No submission to laws except those which the citizen has contributed to 
form and pass, and an organism by which public opinion is gathered, settled, 
mutually modified, and passed into public will, that is law; and by which, on the 
other hand, public reason and carefully formed public opinion are secured 
against merely general and passionate opinion of society itself, or of the 
multitude. 
  Security against absolutism, that is, dictation by power, whether it be the 
dictation of one or of the unmitigated power of the multitude. 
  Popular control over public funds. 
  The right of peaceably meeting and discussing public matters; the right of 
petitioning. 
  A share of the people in the administration of justice, and a guarantee 
against purely formal justice; trial by jury. 
  Certainty of a trial by common courts as established by law; no 
extraordinary courts or commissions. 
  A highly-protected penal trial, and especially a trial for treason, hedged in 
by the safest guarantees of the rights and safety of the individual against the 
prosecuting public power; defence of the accused by counsel. 
  The right of association for religious, moral, industrial, scientific, or political 
purposes. 
  Political equality or absence of privileges for the benefit or the privileged or 
privileged classes. 
  Protection of lawful opposition to the administration and protection of the 
minority against the majority. 
  Security that the people be well informed of their government; publicity of 
all administration of justice; of the finances and legislative debates, and of 
whatever may be public without injury to the public service. 
  Arming of the citizens. 
  Submission of the army to the law; no standing army, or a small one only, 
and votes of money supply for the same at short intervals; the mutiny-bill 
principle. 
  Security against the absorbing sway and domination of the central 
government; the communities, as towns, districts, etc., administering their own 
affairs. 
  Supremacy of the law over every one, crown or citizen; consequently no 
“power of dispensation.” 
  Consequently, where enacted (written) constitutions exist, the authority of 
the proper courts to declare laws as conflicting with the fundamental law or 
constitution; security that the  national sense ultimately prevail, and, 
consequently, dependence of the executive upon supplies—or, which amounts to 
the same thing—a government by parties; that is, men who stand pledged upon 
principles and measures of national magnitude, and not a government by the will 
of the executive, independent of the people; or by intrigues of individuals, or by 
administrations forming no homogeneous whole. 
  Responsibility of ministers; responsible officers, each of whom remains 
individually responsible for what he does, even though commanded to do so by 
rightful authority. 
  Security that the national sense control, whether directly or indirectly, yet 
truly, the power of making war and peace. 
  An independent judiciary and the independence of the law. 
  Protection of aliens and foreigners, no droit d’Aubaine. 
 
Hence common law and the principle of the precedent.  The last is at least 
acknowledged as indispensable to civil liberty by the English and Americans, but not yet 
on the European continent. 
 
Generally the guarantee of all these rights in a constitution, that is fundamental law, 
superior to government.  This is especially important; mere usage, as in England, does 
not stand instead of it. 
 
In summing up these principles and institutions, it appears that they are guarantees of 
the security of individual property, of personal liberty, and individual humanity, of the 
security of society against the assaults or interference of public power, of the certainty 
with which public opinion shall become public will in an organic way, and of the 
protection of the minority.  Many of these have originated, nearly all of them have first 
been developed, in England; but they are not confined to that country, nor have all of 
them, by any means, been developed in as high a degree in England as in America.  In 
all countries where civil liberty is aimed at these principles have been adopted, more or 
less.  We are justified, then, in saying, that when we speak in a practical sense of 
modern liberty, we mean these practical provisions and political contrivances.  It is they 
that constitute the difference between this our modern, national, broad-cast liberty and 
the medieval liberty, which was characterized by isolating political independence, by 
chartered freedom.  “In the Middle Ages, governments chartered liberty; in our times, 
the people, or popular liberty, charters governments.”2
                                                     
2 Wherever modern civil liberty has been established, no matter in what country, we find the following 
contests; under whatever name, the principle is the same, for the contending agents are the same, 
namely, Power and Liberty: 
 
 The letter de cachet, or general warrant—i.e., arrest on the ground of its having been ordered by 
the executive.  In England it began seriously under James L.  The history of the general warrant 
is a most interesting thread in English history. 
 
 Proclamation, or pretence of power above law, and connected with this the dispensing power.  
Chief-Justice Fleming, when chief baron, in 1604, decided that the king had the undoubted right 
to levy whatever import tax he thought fit.  This case is called “The Great Case of Impositions.”  
Parliament had passed an impost of 2s. 6d. per cwt. Upon currants, and James and added 7s. 
6d. per cwt.  Bates, a Levant merchant, went to law, and Fleming made a long, outrageous 
speech in favor of the king’s power.  Lord Campbell (Chief Justices of England, i. 234) says that if 
the British commerce had then been as important as now, there would have been an end to 
parliaments, for any government might have supported itself by import tariffs.  He also expresses 
surprise that no historian mentions this solemn though outrageous decision.  It is one of the many 
pieces of great good fortune in British history. 
 
 An army, independent of parliament and people.  As now, in Prussia, the struggle not to let the 
army take the oath on the constitution.  A standing army. 
 
 Taxation without a legislature, either entire or partially, and the ardent endeavor to rule without 
 
It is obvious, that, where so many important principles are in action, one or the other 
may be more active than the rest, or may be developed even to the injury of some of the 
others; so that in the sphere of political freedom there arise, as in all spheres of 
unfettered action, different schools, to borrow a term from the province of philosophy 
and that of the arts.  It is thus that we have in the province of political freedom an 
Anglican and Gallican school.  The term Anglican has been adopted here for want of a 
better one.  We stand in need of a term which designates characteristics peculiar to the 
Anglican race in Europe, here, and in other parts of the world.  If they are not all peculiar 
to this race, they are at least characteristics, which form very prominent marks of its 
politics. 
 
It is by no means the object here to show the gradual development of modern liberty 
and of the Anglican characteristics, their causes, and the circumstances under which 
they developed themselves, but rather to point out in what at this moment consist the 
striking features of these two political schools.  With this view, it may be stated at once, 
that Anglican liberty distinguishes itself above all by a decided tendency to fortify 
individual independence, and by a feeling of self-reliance.  The higher the being stands 
in the scale of nature, the more distinct is its individuality until it reaches in man its 
highest degree, and among men again we find the same principle prevailing.  The 
higher, the more intellectual, and the more ethical the being is, the more prominent is 
also his own peculiar individuality.  The same progress is observed in the scale of civil 
liberty.  Individuality is almost annihilated in absolutism—whether this be of a 
monarchical or a democratic cast—while the highest degree of freedom (in the Anglican 
view of the subject) brings out the individuality of every one, and the individual activity of 
each, as best it seems to him, in its freest play.  Independence in the highest degree, 
compatible with safety and broad national guarantees of liberty, is the great aim of 
Anglican liberty, and self-reliance is the chief source from which it draws its strength.  At 
no period has the deplorable absorbing concentration of power, which characterized the 
political systems of the continent of Europe, during the seventeenth and eighteenth 
centuries, obtained a footing among the Anglican peoples, although it was several times 
strenuously attempted.  All the maxims of the common law, most dear to the people, 
and most frequently quoted with pride as distinguishing it favorably from the civil law, 
embody this manly feeling of individual independence. 
 
Everywhere is liberty considered by the Anglican nations to consist, in a very high 
                                                                                                                                                                           
parliaments, which succeeded wherever the government was able to obtain a revenue without the 
consent of the legislature. 
 
 Extra courts of justice, commissions, etc.; arbitrary trials for high treason. 
 
 Extinction of the liberty of the press, and of discussion and opposition. 
 
Whenever a new power grows despotic, these things are struggled for again.  Thus the people first wrest 
them from the monarch; but where the popular power becomes despotic in turn, all these things are 
claimed again by the people, for instance, in France during the revolution, and by Cromwell in England.  
Wise men, therefore, leave these powers in the hands of no one. 
degree, in a proper limitation of public power.  Anglican liberty may be said to consist, 
essentially, in a proper restriction of government, on the one hand, and a proper amount 
of power on the other, sufficient to prevent mutual interference with this personal 
independence among the people themselves, so that order and a law-abiding spirit 
becomes another of its distinctive features.  No people of the past or present have ever 
made use of the right of association, even where it fully existed, equal to the vast, and 
at times gigantic application of this right, to great practical purposes of a social, as well 
as political, character among the English and Americans.  Public interference is odious 
to them.  Government with the, is not considered the educator, leader, or organizer of 
society.  On the contrary, in reading the many constitutions which this race has 
produced, and the object of which is to define the spheres of the various public powers, 
and to fix the rights of the individual, we almost fancy to read over all of them the motto, 
“Hands off.” 
 
This tendency of seeking liberty, above all, in untrammeled action, has produced among 
others the following great effects. 
 
The untrammeled action or absence of public interference (which of course must in its 
nature be almost always of an executive character) has not been restricted to 
individuals, but as a matter of course, the spirit has extended to institutions and whole 
branches of power, so that time was allowed to them to grow, to develop themselves, 
and to acquire their own independent being; consequently, we find the word law 
possesses a meaning very different from that which the corresponding words have even 
in their most comprehensive sense, with other nations; we find a common law rooted 
deeper in the people than any enacted law or constitution; we find a parliamentary law 
(no “reglement”); we find the indispensable principle of the precedent of greater power 
than minister or crown, even though it be worn by a Stuart, or a Henry the Eighth. 
 
Secondly, a consequence of the principle of self-reliance is, that liberty is conceived far 
more essentially to consist in a great amount of important rights, than in a direct share 
in the government.  The latter is sought after as a security and guarantee for the former. 
 
Thirdly, Anglican liberty consists in or produces the utmost variety, as all untrammeled 
life and unfettered individual action necessarily does.  Equality (if sought in aught else 
than in equality of freedom from interference, and if believed to consist in uniformity 
alone) is monotony, and becomes the opposite to life and action. 
 
Fourthly, the Anglican race has mixed up subjects purely social with politics, far less 
than any other race, and it may be safely averred, has allowed itself to be less misled by 
phantoms, and adhered more to positive realities in the sphere of public life, than any 
other division of mankind. 
 
Every great principle or movement of mankind has its own characteristic fanaticism, 
caricature, or mischievous extravagance.  This applies to all movements, religious, 
social, or political, and Anglican individualism leads, if carried beyond its proper line, to 
selfish isolation and heartless egotism.  The fanaticism of Anglican individualism is 
Utilitarianism as it has been taught by some.  But it must not be forgotten that we speak 
here of civil liberty alone.  No American, or Englishman, has ever maintained that we 
can do without patriotism, without devotion to the public, and it is a striking fact, 
admitted by all, that nowhere is shown so much public spirit, during successive periods, 
as by the Anglican people, although it might have been supposed that their 
individualism would have led to the opposite.  The reason is, that Anglican liberty makes 
the people rely upon themselves, and not upon public power; they feel, therefore, that 
they ought to help declared, in one of his proclamations, that France should imitate the 
example of Paris, which he called the center and representative of French virtue, 
intelligence, action, and patriotism.  How strange a similar declaration of an English 
minister, with reference to London, would sound in the ear of an Englishman, or of our 
President with reference to New York, or any state of ours!3
 
 
Concentration of the most stringent kind existing, and it being neither disrelished nor 
suspected by the people, it is obvious that, coupled with the idea of liberty, in 
contradistinction to despotism, it can produce no other idea than equality—an equal 
change of “ruled and being ruler”; and since equality, with this political meaning, is a 
practical impossibility with a nation so vast as the French, we have the further 
consequence that, practically speaking, equality means in France always the exclusive 
sway of a certain class.  He that seeks now to sway is the Ouvrier, and Bourgeoisie has 
actually become a name of shame or hatred, as the term noblesse had become in the 
first revolution. 
 
Gallican liberty, then, is sought in the government, and, according to an Anglican point 
of view, it is looked for in a wrong place, where it cannot be found.  Necessary 
consequences of the Gallican view are, that the French look for the highest degree of 
political civilization in organization, that is, in the highest degree of interference by public 
power.  The question whether this interference be despotism or liberty is decided solely 
by the fact who interferes, and for the benefit of which class the interference takes 
place, while according to Anglican views this interference would always be either 
absolutism or aristocracy, and the present dictatorship of the ouvriers would appear to 
us an uncompromising aristocracy of the ouvriers. 
 
The universal acknowledgment of organization makes the Frenchmen look for every 
                                                     
3 The most remarkable fact in history, so far as centralization is concerned, is probably the last French 
revolution (of 1847).  A minority—but allow even a majority—of a single city changes a monarchy into a 
republic; the republic is telegraphed into the provinces and France is a republic, without any attempt at 
resistance, any show of adhesion to the former government, any struggle.  If all France had been so 
thoroughly prepared for the republic (which we now know was not the case) that nothing more than the 
breathing of the name was adversary, the former government must long before have collapsed.  And if 
this was not the case, the so-called republic would not have been received so easily, were not the French 
accustomed to receive everything from Paris, fashions, pronunciations, and orders, and even now 
telegraphic dispatches telling the prefect Monsieur so and so, that Il n’y a plus de roi, or some such thing.  
Is not the people in a very abject state where such things can occur?  Is this not Russian?  Does it not 
remind of the worst times of Rome?  The French often, may, almost universally, confound this submission 
to Paris with laudable patriotism.  But this only shows the m ore the absorbing centralization which exists 
in France. 
improvement at once to government.4
                                                     
4 All that I have said is exhibited in a very striking manner in a speech of Victor Hugo’s, in July, 1850, on 
the new law of the press, a speech full of beauties and error, as almost all of his discourses are.  I have 
added the chief passage having especial reference to the subject here treated. 
  Self-reliance does not exist in detail.  While the 
British race seeks for one of the great applications of liberty in free trade, the French call 
for organization of labor, and M. Louis Blanc has proposed a plan, accordingly, which 
would appear to us as insufferable tyranny, and annihilation of individuality.  While we 
have seen, in the anti-corn-law league, a mighty private association coping with the 
most powerful interest that ever existed in a legislature, the British land-owner, and 
ultimately forcing government to fall into its own ranks, we do not find a solitary club in 
Paris pursuing one detailed practical measure, but all discuss the best organization, and 
to the minister of justice, and of worship, and others whom previous “organization” had 
already created, a minister of labor, and even one of progress has been added, if the 
papers have informed us correctly.  In Anglican liberty the movement not only begins 
with the people, but also the practical carrying out.  In France, liberty is expected to 
begin practically with government organization, and to descend to the people. 
 
“Messieurs, quoique les vérités fondamentales, qui sont la base de toute démocratie, et en particulier de 
la grande démocratie française aient reçu le 31 mai dernier une grave atteinte, comme l’avenir n’est 
jamais fermé, il est toujours temps de les rappeler à une assemble legislative.  Ces vérités, selon moi, les 
voice: 
 
“La souveraineté du people, le suffrage universel, la liberté de la presse, sont trios choses identiques, ou, 
pour mieux dire, c’est le même chose sous trios noms différens.  A elles trios, elles constituent notre droit 
public tout entire:  la première en est le principe, la seconde en est le mode, la troisième en est le verbe.  
La souveraineté du people, c’est la nation à l’état abstrait, c’est l’âme du pays; elle se manifeste sous 
deux formes:  d’une main, elle écrit, c’est la liberté de la presse; de l’autre, elle vote, c’est le suffrage 
universel. 
 
“Ces trios choses, ces trios faits, ces trios principes, lies d’une solidarité essentielle, faisant chacun leur 
fonction, la souveraineté du people vivifiant, le suffrage universel gouvernant, la presse éclairant, se 
confondent dans une etroite et indissoluble unite, et cette unite, c’est la République. 
 
“Et voyez comme toutes les vérités se retrouvent et se rencontrent, parce qu’ayant le même point de 
depart, elles ont nécessairement le même point d’arrivée!  La souveraineté du people crée la liberté, le 
suffrage universel crée l’egalité, la presse, qui fait le jour dans les espirts, crée la fraternité. 
 
“Partout où ces trios principes, souveraineté du people, suffrage universel, liberté de la presse, existent 
dans leur puissance et dans leur plentitude, la République existe, même sous le mot monarchie; là où 
ces trios principes sont amoindris dans leur développement, opprimés dans leur action, méconnus dans 
leur solidarité, contestés dans leu majesté, il y a monarchie ou oligarchie, même sous le mot République. 
 
“Et c’est alors, comme rien n’est plus dans l’ordre, qu’on peut voir ce phénomene monstrueux d’un 
gouvernement renié par ses propres founctionnaires.  On d’être renié à être trahi, il n’y a qu’un pas! 
 
“Et c’est alors que les plus fermes coeurs se prennent à douter des révolution ces grands événements 
maladroits qui font sortir de l’ombre en même temps de si hautes idées et de si petits hommes! 
 
“Des Révolutions, que nous proclamons des bienfaits quand nous voyons leurs principes, mais qu’on 
peut, certes, appeler des catastrophes quand on voit leurs ministres! 
 
“Je reviens, messieurs, à ce que je disais.” 
 
This is so true, that a large number of the French (we believe it to be a minority, but it is 
the active and loud minority) seem to have wholly discarded the idea that liberty is the 
main object to be striven for, and call for a social reorganization, and a very busy and 
wide-spread club at Paris has actually hoisted a banner on which the word Liberty is 
omitted, bearing the following device: Equality, Solidarity, Fraternity.  Here, then, we 
have the caricature of French liberty, as we have in ultra-utilitarianism that of Anglican 
freedom.  Equality and solidarity are necessary elements of all politics.  Without 
solidarity no nation could be a nation, no state a state.  Every one is obliged to bear with 
laws which he considers bad, or the consequences of a war which he condemns.  It is 
the price we pay for living in a civil society; but if solidarity be elevated into a distinctive 
mark of a specific political or social system it is the death-blow to individualism, and a 
Spartan republic, destroying the family, must be the consequence.  Here, too, is to be 
found the reason of the striking phenomenon, that at all periods the fanatics who have 
attempted the abolition of private property always made war against exclusive or 
individual marriage at the same time.  Many communists have preached it, and many 
religious fanatics in the Middle Ages have attempted it. 
 
The fact that Gallican liberty expects everything from organization, while Anglican liberty 
inclines to development, explains why we see in France so little improvement and 
expansion of institutions;5
 
 but when improvement is attempted, a total abolition of the 
preceding state of things—a beginning ab ovo—a re-discussion of the first elementary 
principles. 
Anglican liberty produces variety, as was stated before, and demands absence of 
unnecessary restraint; Gallican liberty demands uniformity and even uniforms, so 
odious to Americans.  A proclamation of the provisional government, dated April 30, 
actually begins with the words:  “Considering that the principle of equality implies 
uniformity of costume for the citizens called to the same functions,” etc., prescribing a 
costume—coat, waistcoat, and pantaloons, to the members of the national assembly—
that assembly which, according to the expression of the provisional government itself, is 
the highest representative of national sovereignty that has ever assembled, and into 
whose hands that same provisional government will lay down its power.  Nothing can 
show more distinctly the difference between Anglican and Gallican liberty than that this 
order was possible. 
                                                     
5 Lamartine, in his famous speech on the law of election, May 23, 1850, speaks of this very thing.  He 
calls it the French impatience du mieux.  This is very true as far as it goes.  I have spoken of impatience 
as a  most dangerous element in politics, as in all else, in my Ethics; but Lamartine would have been 
more philosophical, would have gone farther back to the principle, as well as farther on to the practical 
results and mischiefs, had he seized upon the subject as I have done here.  This impatience is both 
cause and effect of the fact that the French, whatever they may have been once, have been made, since 
the times of Richelieu and Louis XIV., and un-institutional people.  Institutions—the idea of letting them 
grow, changing, amending, as the times suggest changes and amendments, and allowing them their own 
existence and expansion without continually having the executive and legislative finger on them—are 
founded upon and require the very principles of patience.  In this the English have given the most 
illustrious example, although at times this principle, as all others, is carried to a degree of caricature, as 
illustrated in the lord chancellor’s unsightly, untimely, and burlesque wig. 
Vol. II.--25 
 
In England and America, the principle of liberty dictates that all that can be done by 
private enterprise ought to be left to it, and that the people ought to enjoy the fruits of 
competition in the highest possible degree.  In France, on the other hand, the 
provisional government made arrangements to buy up all the railways so soon as the 
king had been expelled. 
 
All political changes, according to Anglican liberty, are intended more efficiently to 
protect the changes which society has worked for itself; according to Gallican liberty, the 
great changes are intended to be, not political, but social, organized by government:  
that is, according to Anglican liberty, forced upon society by the successful party, which, 
nevertheless, may be a very small minority, owing to the peculiar power which, in the 
great system of concentration, Paris exercises over France, and which all movable 
masses exercise over populous cities—an influence considered salutary according to 
Gallican views of liberty, and disastrous according to Anglican. 
 
The object of this paper has been to show the difference of the two schools, and it 
would be foreign to the subject to dwell upon the generous enthusiasm which pervades 
at this moment large parts of the French people, and, coupled as it is with the fearful 
reminiscences of former days, has produced some very remarkable effects; but 
enthusiasm cannot last, and, if it could, it cannot become a substitute for individualism, 
an indispensable element of our ethical nature.  Enthusiasm is a necessary element of  
all great actions of individuals as well as masses, but he who founds upon it plans of a 
permanent state of things, whether in worship or politics, deprives his system of 
durability.  Nothing can insure principles against an early withering but institutions.  No 
ruler, however popular or brilliant, no period, however glorious, and no enthusiasm, 
however generous, can produce lasting good if they do not lead first of all to the 
foundation of expansive institutions.  Nations must neither depend upon popular rulers, 
nor trust their own enthusiasm.  If they do, everything is frail and evanescent, and the 
continuity of the state, without which there is no law, order, strength, or greatness, is 
rendered impossible. 
 
This remark leads us to the last observation we mean to make upon the difference of 
Anglican and Gallican liberty.  The Anglican race is a decidedly institution-loving and 
institution-building race, as the Romans were, who built up the civil law.  They are 
conservative as well as progressive, and believe that conservatism is as necessary an 
element as progression.  The fanaticism of conservatism is a Chinese idolatry of the 
past and the old.  The French, on the other hand, as they appear, at least in modern 
times, are philosophizing, often brilliant, organizers, and resemble in this more the 
Greeks, who built up no law but whose philosophers proposed invented governments.  
The fanaticism of this disposition is a restless re-beginning at every step and denial of 
the necessity of continuous progress. 
 
It must have appeared to the reader that the writer of this paper is an advocate and 
lover of the principles of Anglican liberty; that he believes the French are mistaking 
democratic absolutism for democratic liberty; that the whole continent will have to pass 
through long periods of ardent struggle before it can rid itself of the consequences of the 
unhallowed centralization, which absolute princes in their blindness mistook for power, 
and fastened upon the people; that he is a devoted friend to independence, and the 
liberty of the individual, which, in his opinion, need be as little connected with 
selfishness as Christianity is, although this religion, above all others, throws man upon 
his individual responsibility, thus raising him immeasurably; that, however dazzling the 
effects of democratic absolutism occasionally may be, it is still not freedom, which, like 
dew, nourishes every blade in its own individuality, and thus produces the great 
combined phenomenon of living nature; and that he would infinitely prefer a life in one of 
our loneliest log-houses to a barrack-residence of absolute equality, stifling his own 
individuality and that of every one of his fellow-citizens, however brilliant that barrack 
might be furnished.6
 
  But whether these are the views of the writer or not, is of little 
importance.  The truth remains the same, that the difference pointed out by him exists 
between the two modes of liberty, that they differ widely, and that it behooves every 
sincere friend of liberty to reflect maturely on the subject and to come to clear results; 
especially on the European continent, where liberty is in a nascent state, and is of 
course exposed to be seriously injured in the tender age of her infancy; while a closer 
geographical connection with France often leads to the adoption of measures and views 
peculiar to that country, when no intrinsic reason for doing so exists.  The European 
continental countries have had their periods of absorbing and life-destroying 
centralization.  The principles of our liberty, therefore, are peculiarly necessary to the 
people of the European continent.  Many of them seem to fall into the same unfortunate 
delusion of expecting everything from organization by public power. 
-- Francis Lieber, Miscellaneous Writings, vol. 2:  Contributions to Political Science.  
  Philadelphia: J.B. Lippincott and Company, 1880. 
 
 FRANCIS LIEBER: ANGLICAN AND GALLICAN LIBERTY 
 
A. THE IDEA OF LIBERTY: UNRESTRAINEDNESS OF ACTION (371-73) 
 1. Civil Liberty Is Relative 
a. Definition: "The highest amount of that untrammeled and well-guaranteed action 
 or absence of interference which is compatible with a social state and with the 
  objects of a government established to obtain, by united energy, that which 
    is considered essential to each member, but cannot, or ought not, [to] be 
    obtained by individual exertion." 
2.  The Idea of Civil Liberty Varies at Various Stages of Civilization Relative to What Views 
 Men May Take of What Is Essential to Man 
a. Ancient Liberty: Man in His Highest Phase Viewed as a Citizen, and Is Only Man 
 in the True Sense as a Member of the State 
b. Christian and Modern Liberty: Individual Is the Highest Object and the State, 
 Law, and Government Are Still But a Means to Obtain the Yet Higher Objects of 
  Humanity 
                                                     
6 The writer is no admirer of the feudal ages.  He has repeatedly given his views of that period, the 
essential principles of which with its graduated allegiance are wholly unfit for our nobler freedom.  
Whenever he has spoken of individual freedom in this paper, he has meant individual independence 
within nationalized societies, under the protection of broad, wide, organic, pervading civil liberty—the very 
opposite to medieval spitefulness, arrogation, lawlessness, unnational and unsocial liberty. 
 3. Institutions that Serve Liberty 
  a. Aristotle's Politics 
c. Agreement of European and Americans upon the Political Principles and 
 Measures Necessary for the Establishment or Perpetuation of Liberty 
 4. Modern Liberty Is Guaranteed Chiefly against Public Power 
B. MODERN CIVIL LIBERTIES (373-76) 
 1. Public and Private Communication 
 2. Sovereignty of the People to Adopt or Supplement a Government 
 3. Full Protection of Person through Due Process of Law 
 4. Free Choice of Residence and Right of Migration 
 5. Liberty of Worship and Conscience 
 6. Protection of Free Production and Exchange; No Taxation without Consent 
7. Submission Only to Lawful Authority; Perfect Right of Resisting Unlawful Demands 
[Civil Disobedience] 
8. Submission Only to Laws that Public Opinion Has Gathered, Settled, Mutually Modified, 
and Passed into Public Will  
 9. Security against Dictation by Power 
  10. Popular Control over Public Funds 
 11. Right of Peaceable Assembly and Petition 
 12. Trial by Jury and Right to Participate in the Administration of Justice 
 13. Trial Only by Common Courts Established by Law 
 14. Penal Trials Hedged in by Due Process Protections; Right to Counsel 
 15. Right of Association 
 16. Political Equality; Absence of Class Privileges 
 17. Protection of Lawful Opposition and Minorities 
 18. Freedom of Information or Publicity Concerning Government Actions 
 19. Right of Citizens to Bear Arms 
20. Civilian Control of the Army through Law and Short-Term Appropriations; Mutiny-Bill 
 Principle 
 21. Local Self-Government [cf. Sphere Sovereignty, Principle of Subsidiarity] 
 22. Supremacy of Law; No Power of Dispensation 
 23. Judicial Review in Case of a Written Constitution; Government by Parties 
 24. Individual Responsibility (and Accountability) of Public Officers [cf. Nuremberg trials] 
 25. Power of Making War and Peace Controlled by the National Sense (Public Opinion) 
 26. Independent Judiciary and Independence of the Law (Rule of Law) 
 27. Protection of Aliens 
 28. Common Law and the Principle of the Precedent 
 29. Guarantee of These Rights in a Fundamental Law Superior to Government 
30. Summary: Guarantees of the Security of Individual Life, Liberty, and Property, the 
Security of Society against the Abuse of Public Power, and the Means of Translating 
Public Opinion into Public Will 
31. Medieval vs. Modern Liberty: "In the Middle Ages, governments chartered liberty; in our 
times, the people, or popular liberty, charters governments." 
  a. Contests that Erupt Wherever Modern Liberty Is Established (footnote): 
    1) General Warrants Issued by the Executive 
   2) Rule by Executive Proclamation [Great case of Impositions, 1604] 
   3) Independence of Armies from Popular Control 
   4) Taxation without Popular Consent 
   5) Extraordinary Courts and Commissions 
   6) Freedom of Press, Discussion, and Opposition Suppressed 
C. THE ANGLICAN SCHOOL (377-80) 
 1. Anglican Liberty: Distinguished by a Tendency to Fortify Individual Independence and 
by a Feeling of Self-Reliance 
 a. Individuality Is Almost Annihilated in Absolutism 
 b. The Highest Degree of Freedom (in the Anglican View) Brings Out the 
Individuality in Every One 
 2. Great Aim of Anglican Liberty: Independence in the Highest Degree Compatible with 
Safety and Broad National Guarantees of Liberty 
 3. Anglican Peoples Have Repeatedly Avoided the Deplorable Absorbing Concentration of 
Power Characteristic of the Continental Systems 
 a. Common Law Maxims Distinguished Favorably from the Civil Law 
 4. Liberty Consists in a Proper Limitation of Public Power 
 a. Balancing of Order and a Law-Abiding Spirit 
 b. High Use of the Right of Association 
 c. Statism Rejected: Government Is Not the Educator, Leader, or Organizer of 
Society [cf. Budziszewski on Inculcation] 
  d. [On the Other Hand: The Anglican School Has No Idea of a Fixed Constitution] 
 5. Effects 
 a. Institutional Liberty Based on Common Law and Precedent as Opposed to 
Positive Law or Prerogative 
 b. Liberty Consists in Rights Rather than a Direct Share in Government; the Latter 
Is Sought as a Security for the Former 
 c. Liberty Produces Variety Rather than the Monotony of Equality or Uniformity 
 d. Politics Is Less Likely to Be Mixed Up with Social Matters 
 6. The Characteristic Extreme (Its Fanaticism, Caricature, or Extravagance) 
 a. Anglican Individualism May Lead to Selfish Isolation and Heartless Egotism 
 1) Utilitarianism as Taught by Some 
 7. Patriotism and Devotion to the Public 
  a. Nowhere Is Shown So Much Public Spirit 
 b. People Must Rely on Themselves, Not Upon the Public Power and Therefore 
Feel They Ought to Help Each Other and Depend on Their Own United Action 
[Voluntary Principle] 
D. ANGLICAN VIEW OF THE FRENCH DEVICE: LIBERTY, EQUALITY, FRATERNITY (380-81) 
 1. Liberty Is the Breath of Conscious Man, Aspired by All 
 2. Equality 
 a. As the Absence of Privilege, Equality is Comprehended within the Term “Liberty” 
 b. If It Means Social Uniformity [Identitarianism], It Is Characteristic of Absolutism 
 c. If It Means Unrestrainedness, It Implies Variety 
 d. Democratic Absolutism as Exhibited in Ancient Athens 
 e. Diversity Is the Law of All Organic Life 
 3. Fraternity: The Divine Principle of All Social Existence 
 a. It Is Not Necessarily Connected with Liberty 
E. GALLICAN LIBERTY (382-84) 
 1. England: Nobility Assimilated Itself with the People at an Early Period 
 2. All Other Countries: Nobility Remained Selfish, Oppressive, Rebellious 
 a. Their Power Broken in France by Absolute Monarchs 
 b. Barons Converted into Servile Courtiers 
 c. Consequence: Louis XIV Created a System of Such Absorbing Centralization 
that He Left France without Independent Institutions, and without Money, or 
Morality in the Leading Classes 
3. Such Concentration, When Coupled with the Idea of Liberty, Can Produce No Other Idea 
 than Equality 
 a. Effectively, This Means the Exclusive Sway of a Certain Class (Now Sought by 
the Working Class: the Ouvriers) 
 4. Gallican Liberty Is Sought in the Government 
  a. Necessary Consequences of this View 
 1) The Highest Degree of Interference by Public Power 
 2) [What Karl Marx Called the Dictatorship of the Proletariat] 
 5. Lack of Self-Reliance 
 a. Louis Blanc: Plan for the Organization of Labor [cf. Bastiat on Blanc] 
F. ANGLICAN AND GALLICAN LIBERTY DISTINGUISHED (384-87) 
 1. Anglican: Initiative and Implementation Undertaken by the People 
 2. Gallican: Liberty Begins with Government and Descends to People 
 a. Focus on Solidarity: Caricature of French Liberty [cf. General Will] 
 1) Consequence: A Spartan Republic that Destroys the Family 
3. Gallican Liberty Emphasizes Organization and Fresh Starts; Anglican Liberty 
Emphasizes Development 
 4. Anglican Liberty Produces Variety; Gallican Liberty Demands Uniformity 
 5. England and America: Private Enterprise; France: Nationalization of Railroads 
5. Anglican Liberty: Political Change Intended to Protect Changes Society Works out for 
 Itself; Gallican Liberty: Social Changes Are Organized by the Government 
6. Enthusiasm of the French Is No Substitute for Individualism; Durability Requires 
Institutions [Hence, Institutional Liberty] 
 8. The Institution-Building of the Romans and English Contrasted with the Evanescent 
Brilliance of the Greeks and French 
G. SUMMARY (387-88) 
    
Review 
 
distinguish between ancient and modern views of liberty  greatest danger that threatens citizen 
great effects of Anglican Liberty University     contests that erupt wherever modern liberty is established 
summary of principles and institutions of Liberty University effects of Anglican liberty 
characteristics of Gallican liberty and differences with Anglican liberty   solidarity 
extreme forms of each type 
